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test, where it would strike down legislation "only if it [was] so unrelated to
legitimate purpose that government
actions were irrational." Id. (quoting
Gregory v. Ashcroft, III S. Ct. 2395,
2406 (1991».
Secondly, the court identified "intermediate scrutiny," or "heightened
scrutiny." For this classification to be
sustained it "must serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of
those objectives." Id. at 110 (quoting
Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197
(1976».
The court then recognized the third
category involving cases where a "sus..,
pect class" or a "fundamental right"
was burdened. The court explained
that the classification was subject to
strict scrutiny and it would uphold
such a law "under equal protection
guarantee only if it [was] shown that
'they are suitably tailored to serve a
compelling state interest. ,,, Id. at 109
(quoting Cleburne v. Cleburne Living
Center, 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985».
The plaintiffs argued that the intermediate scrutiny test should apply because section 11-1 08 limits an "important personal right." Id. at 111. The
plaintiffs asserted that this personal
right arose out of the common law
right to be compensated for
noneconomic damages. The court of
appeals refused to apply the intermediate test on the basis that, in its view, the
right to compensation under common
law does not give rise to an "important
personal right." The court stated, "a
legislative cap of $350,000 upon the
amount of noneconomic damages
which can be awarded to a tort plaintiff
does not implicate such an important
'right' as to trigger any enhanced scrutiny." Id.
The court based its position on article 5 of the Maryland Declaration of
Rights, which said the common law
was subject "to the revision of and
amendment or repeal by the legislature
of this state." Id. at 112. The court
reasoned that just because a law was
found in the common law does not

mean that the legislature could not
change it. Further, the court emphasized that iftheplaintiffs' position was
adopted, every common law would
become a personal right and applying
the intermediate standard of review
would prevent the legislature from
making many laws. Id.
The court pointed out that its decision followed the United States Supreme Court's ruling in Duke Power
Co. v. Carolina Env. Study Group, 438
U.S. 59 (1978), where the Court applied the rational basis test to a legislative cap on tort damages in nuclear
power accidents. In that case, the
Court stated that the law was "'a classic example of an economic regulation' needed to accommodate 'the burdens and benefits of economic life, '"
and further emphasized that '''[a] person has no property, no vested interest,
in any rule of the common law.'" Id.
(quoting Duke Power, 438 U.S. at 88).
The court of appeals further stated
that its holding does not limit a person's
access to the courts, as the Murphys
argued. The court reasoned that modifying the substantive law does not restrict access to the courts. Even if
section 11-108 was restrictive, the court
explained, it would be reasonable based
upon the legislative intent of increasing the availability of insurance in
Maryland. Id. at 113-14.
Having decided that the rational
basis test applied in this case, the court
viewed the statute as constitutional.
The court looked to the General
Assembly's reasoning for passing the
legislation. The court noted the
legislature's concern about the availability and cost ofliability insurance in
Maryland, the excessive insurance premiums for doctors, and the declining
services available for patients. The
court noted that the stated purpose of
the law was to "assure the availability
of sufficient liability insurance, at a
reasonable cost, in orderto coverclairns
for personal injuries to members of the
public." Id. at 115. As such, it served
a legitimate state purpose and applied
to all personal injury claimants equally,

ratherthan singling out one category of
claimants. Therefore, the court held
that the noneconomic damages cap was
neither irrational or arbitrary.
The plaintiffs' second argument was
that the cap violated their right to a jury
trial as guaranteed by articles 5 and 23
ofthe Maryland Declaration ofRights.
Their rights, the plaintiffs argued, were
violated because the cap interfered with
the jury's ability to properly determine
damages and also interfered ''with the
jury's exclusive province in determining factual issues." Id. at 116. The
court rejected this argument, stating
that, because it was decided that the
legislature was allowed to cap
noneconomic damages, there was nothing for the judge or the jury to decide.
Id. The right to a jury trial arises in
cases where the result or issue must be
decided by either the judge or the jury.
The court held, however, that the legislature had taken the issue of
noneconomic damages out ofthe hands
of both the judge and jury. ld.
The holding in Murphy settles a
long argument in the legal, legislative
and insurance communities. The Maryland Legislature enacted the
noneconomic damages cap because it
places as a high priority on the availability of insurance to Maryland citizens. The court of appeals has clearly
decided this one issue of whether section 11-108 is constitutional. Yet, it is
foreseeable that more litigation will
follow as future litigants debate issues
regarding whether certain damages are
economic or noneconomic, as well as
to which cases the noneconomic cap
will apply.
- Elizabeth A. Lee

Woodson v. State: HEIGHTENED
EVIDENTIARY FOUNDATION
REQUIRED TO ADMIT CONFESSIONS WHICH TRIGGER
DEATH SENTENCE ELIGIBILITY.
In Woodson v. State, 325 Md. 251,
600 A.2d 420 (1992), the Court of
Appeals of Maryland nullified
petitioner's death sentence by revers-
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ing his first degree murder conviction recovered from Officer Brooks's vest.
and remanding the case for a new trial Swabs taken from petitioner's hands
on that charge. The court held, by a after his arrest indicated that he had
four to three majority, that the trial recently fired a handgun.
Andre Spells testified as a state's
court committed reversible error by
admitting into evidence testimony con- witness at petitioner's trial. Spells
cerning petitioner's alleged jailhouse testified over petitioner's objection
confession without an adequate that, while he was incarcerated in the
Baltimore City jail on October 23,
evidentiary foundation.
Testimony at trial indicated that, 1989, his cellmate, who identified himduring the early morning hours of Oc- self as "Shawn Woodson," confessed
tober 10, 1989, petitioner, Shawn that he had shot and killed Officer
Woodson, was one of five men snort- Martin. Petitioner objected prior to
ing heroin in the stairwell of a Balti- Spell's testimony relating to the conmore City apartment building. Officer fession on the basis that, absent ashowWilliam J. Martin of the Baltimore ing that petitioner was the same "Shawn
City Police Department was the first Woodson" who made the confession,
officer on the scene in response to an the statement was inadmissible hearanonymous complaint of drug use. As say. While laying the foundation for
Officer Martin approached the build- Spells' testimony about the confesing with his car's emergency lights on, sion, the prosecutor twice asked Spells
the group scattered. Two of the men ifhe presently saw in the courtroom the
entered an apartment, another at- person who had identified himself as
tempted to leave the building and was "Shawn Woodson" in the courtroom
frisked and let go by Officer Martin as and Spells twice responded, "I don't
he entered the building. Petitioner and see him." To a third inquiry, Spells
the fifth man, Taavon Hall, remained responded, "I don't recognize him, no."
on the first floor landing of the stair- Following a bench conference, the trial
judge allowed Spells to continue to
well.
Officer Brooks, another officer who testify. Spells went on to testify that
had responded to the scene, testified at "Shawn Woodson's" nickname was
trial that as he entered the building "Buddy," that he had a mid-body inthrough a rear basement door he heard jury, and that he had confessed to killgun shots. Brooks stated that he then ing Officer Martin.
A jury sitting in the Circuit Court
saw Hall run out of the front door as
petitioner ran down the stairs towards for Baltimore City found petitioner
him and the rear door. When the guilty offirst degree murder, attempted
petitioner encountered Brooks, a gun second degree murder, two counts of
battle ensued during which petitioner use of a handgun in the commission of
was struck in the groin area. Officer a crime of violence, and two counts of
Brooks was struck once in the hand and carrying a handgun. After waiving his
twice in the chest area, hitting his bul- right to be sentenced by the jury for the
letproof vest. Petitioner was arrested first degree murder of Officer Martin,
as he attempted to flee out the rear the court sentenced petitioner to death.
Petitioner appealed his conviction to
door.
Officer Martin was found lying in a the court of appeals pursuant to Md.
pool of blood on the first floor landing Ann. Code art. 27, § 414 (1957, 1987
with his service revolver snapped closed Repl. Vol.), and Md. R. P. 8-306(c).
On appeal, petitioner argued that
inside its holster. He died from two
gun shot wounds to the head. Tests Spells' testimony should not have been
revealed that the handgun recovered at admitted in evidence because there was
the scene, near the rear door, was the no evidence which linked him to either
gun that fired the bullets which killed Spells or the alleged confession.
Officer Martin as well as the bullets Woodson, 325 Md. at 259, 600 A.2d at
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424. Petitioner claimed that, given the
fact that three state's witnesses had
previously identified him at trial, the
only reasonable inference to be drawn
from Spells' repeated testimony that
he did not see in the courtroom the
cellmate who had identified himselfas
"Shawn Woodson," was that the
cellmate was not the petitioner. Id.
Petitioner further argued that corroborative details respecting Spells' correct
reference to his nickname and injury
were brought out after the trial judge
indicated that the name "Shawn
Woodson" alone was sufficient identification evidence to support admissibility of Spells' testimony. Id. Additionally, petitioner claimed that the
state's failure to adduce any evidence,
other than Spells' testimony, that he
and Spells were ever cellmates required
the exclusion of Spells' testimony. Id.
at 260, 600 A.2d at 424.
The state maintained on appeal that
Spells' inability to identify petitioner
at trial was a matter solely relating to
the weight of the evidence and not its
admissibility. The state argued that
Spells did not testify that petitioner
was not the man who had confessed to
him, rather, his testimony merely indicated an inability to recognize the
declarant. Id.
The court began its analysis noting
that before an admission of guilt may
be received in evide~ce at trial, the
state has the burden to make a prima
facie showing that the statement was
made by the defendant. Whether the
state met its burden, the court said, is
assessed by considering the circumstances, including Spells' failure at
trial to identify the petitioner as the
person who had confessed to him. Id.
at 261,600 A.2d at 424.
The court of appeals reasoned that
if believed, Spells' testimony established that it was the petitioner and not
Taavon Hall who had murdered Officer Martin. Such testimony implicated
petitioner as a principal in the first
degree for the murder of a police officer in performance of his duties and
therefore made petitioner eligible for

the death penalty. [d. at 262,600 A.2d
at 425. The court emphasized that this
was a capital prosecution, and therefore involved an enhanced punishment.
It compared the case at bar to others
involving enhanced sentencing for recidivists in which it had required more
than identical names to support a presumption of identity of person. [d. at
264-5, 600 A.2d at 426.
The court cited as persuasive authority cases from other jurisdictions
in which a witness attrial was unable to
identify the defendant as the person
who had previously confessed to him.
[d. at261, 600 A.2dat424 (citing York
v. State, 173 N.W.2d 693 (Wis. 1970);
Fisherv. State, 361 S.W.2d 395 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1962)). In those cases
testimony concerning the confessions
was admitted and the convictions were
affinned on appeal. The appellate
courts relied on the fact that other
witnesses, who were present but did
not hear the confessions, were able to
identify the defendants at trial and place
them in the company of the witnesses
who heard and testified to the confessions.
Thus, the court reasoned that while
Spells was able to identify the person
who had confessed to him by name,
nickname, and the fact that he had a
mid-body injury, his failure to identify
the petitioner at trial, combined with
the lack of any evidence that the two
men were together in jail, resulted in an
inadequate evidentiary foundation to
admit the testimony. Woodson, 325
Md. at 263, 600 A.2d at 425. ''To
admit such evidence," the court stated,
"would be, for example, to sanction the
testimony ofany witness who, without
more, claims that a voice on the telephone, which he cannot recognize as
the defendant's, identified himself using the name of the defendant, and
confessed to the crime." [d.
The court acknowledged that there
is some authority that "[i]dentical
names give rise to a presumption of
identity of person." The court reasoned however, "[a]ssuming,
arguendo, that the use of Woodson's

name alone would raise a rebuttable
presumption of identity, the presumption was nullified when Spells testified
that the person who confessed to him
was not in the courtroom." [d. at 264,
600 A.2d at 426. The court held that in
the circumstances of the case, Spells'
conversation was inadmissible hearsay, and to admit it was reversible error
requiring remand for a new trial. [d.
It appears from the ruling in
Woodson that when considering the
admissibility ofconfessions in the context enhanced sentence cases, the Gourt
of Appeals of Maryland will construe
the "circumstances ofthe case" broadly.
Such breadth illustrates the court's distinction of the penalty as part and parcel of the circumstances surrounding
the confession.
- Chris Marts
Molzo/ v. United States: SUPREME
COURT CHOOSES TRADITIONAL DEFINITION FOR "PUNITIVE DAMAGES" UNDER
FEDERAL TORTS CLAIMS ACT.

In the wake of the intense controversy surrounding his appointment to
the nation's highest court, Justice
Clarence Thomas wrote his first United
States Supreme Court opinion for the
Court's unanimous decision to follow
tradition when defming "punitive damages" under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-2680,
the Federal Torts Claims Act (FTCA).
In Molzo/v. United States, 112 S. Ct.
711 (1992), the Court undertook an
exercise in statutory interpretation by
following deeply rooted common law
principles requiring proof of a
defendant's culpability before a plaintiff can recover punitive damages. As
such, punitive damages under the
FTCA are a specific category of damages, the recovery ofwhich depends on
proof ofintentional or flagrant conduct
and the purpose of which is to punish a
defendant for such conduct.
The guardian ad litem of Mr. Robert Molzof brought an action against
the U.S. Government after Mr. Molzof
sustained irreversable brain damage

that left him comatose in a Veterans
Administration hospital as a result of
the employees' negligence. Mr. Molzof
sought damages under the FTCA for
supplemental medical care, future
medical expenses, and loss of enjoyment of life.
The Government conceded to negligence, and at the conclusion of the
bench trial concerning only damages,
the Federal District Court ordered the
hospital to continue the level of care it
had already been providing Molzof in
addition to paying for weekly doctor's
visits and care beyond that which the
hospital could offer. The court refused, however, to award damages reflecting the cost of care already available or damages for loss of enjoyment
of life. Mr. Molzof died after final
judgement from the district court, at
which time Mrs. Shirley Molzof resumed the action as the personal representative of her husband's estate.
Mrs. Molzoftook exception to the
limitations the district court placed on
recovery for Mr. Molzofsdemise. The
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit nevertheless agreed with the lower
court and maintained that any award
exceeding compensation, including
loss of enjoyment of life, was "punitive in effect" and beyond recovery
under the Federal Torts Claim Act.
112 S. Ct. at 714. The United States
Supreme Court granted certiorari in
order to define "punitive damages"
under the FTCA.
The Court began its analysis by
examining the history behind the
FTCA. Having tolerated a laborious
legislative process for compensating
those individuals injured by federal
emp loyees' negligence, Congress
passed the FTCA. The legislation
would allow such victims to sue the
U.S. Government and recover through
a limited waiver of the Government's
sovereign immunity. The Court recognized that, although state law must be
consulted in order to determine the
extent to which the United States can
be held liable under the FTCA, "punitive damages" would in no way recov-
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